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Abstract
In many developing countries, we observe rather high levels of corruption. This is sur-
prising from a political economy perspective, as the majority of people generally suffers from
high corruption levels. We explain why citizens do not exert enough political pressure to
reduce corruption if financial institutions are missing. Our model is based on the fact that
corrupt officials have to pay entry fees to get lucrative positions. The mode of financing this
entry fee determines the distribution of the rents from corruption. In a probabilistic voting
model, we show that a lack of financial institutions can lead to more corruption as more
voters are part of the corrupt system. Thus, the economic system has an effect on political
outcomes. Well-functioning financial institutions, in turn, can increase the political support
for anti-corruption measures.
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1 Introduction
In many developing countries, we observe rather high levels of corruption. This is particularly
surprising from a political economy perspective as the majority of people generally suffers from
high corruption levels. Thus, citizens should have an interest in a reduction of corruption. Why
do citizens not exert more political pressure to reduce the corruption level? In order to answer
this question, we take a closer look at the specific situation in these countries: Corruption
generally spreads over all levels of the bureaucracy. The lower-level officials dealing with firms
and households are not the only ones who demand bribes for providing particular services. The
upper level bureaucrats also profit from corruption by demanding an entry fee for these lucrative
lower-level positions in the bureaucracy.1 The corrupt officials and their superiors are thus the
groups of citizens that benefit from corruption. However, their share of the population is too
small to explain the persistence of corruption.
Investigating the entry fees for lucrative positions in the bureaucracy and the way they are
financed provides an explanation for high corruption levels. Indeed, empirically, better financial
institutions in a country are strongly correlated with a lower corruption level (see section 3).
What is the impact of the effectiveness of the economic system, in our case the financial markets,
on political outcomes? Does a functioning financial market change the way in which the entry
fees are financed? So far, the existing literature does not provide an answer to this question.
In a theoretical model, we explore the link between financial institutions and the incidence of
corruption by analyzing the effects of different modes of financing the entry fees. The existence
of financial institutions changes the distribution of rents from corruption. Thereby, it influences
the political support for anti-corruption measures and the corruption level that is determined
in the political process. Thus, our paper contributes to the literature that analyzes the effects
of the economic system on political outcomes.
In our model, the corrupt officials have to pay entry fees to their superiors. Since the entry
fees cannot be financed by the officials’ savings, they have to borrow at least a part of the
amount. If financial markets are absent, they may resort to their relatives or friends. As the
relatives’ return depends on the corruption level, these financial transactions give them a stake
1For example, engineers of the water irrigation system in India pay entry fees of up to 14 times their annual
salary. See Wade (1982, p. 305) and the discussion in section 3.
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in corruption. Therefore, they do not have the incentives to support anti-corruption campaigns.
With financial markets, citizens may have access to loans. The influence of banks depends on
their possibilities to screen: When banks possess a perfect screening technology that allows
them to deny credit to those debtors who use the money for financing an entry fee, the corrupt
officials will still borrow from their relatives. However, compared to the case without financial
institutions, the interest of corrupt officials and relatives in corruption decreases: Both parties
have the opportunity to save at a bank. This new outside option reduces the net surplus from
corruption that is shared among corrupt officials and relatives. Thus, their support for anti-
corruption measures increases. When banks are not able to screen, they (unknowingly) grant
credit to corrupt officials too. Although the corrupt officials would prefer to borrow from their
relatives in order to give them a vested interest in corruption, they cannot coordinate to do
so. Therefore, the relatives do not have a stake in corruption and become supporters of anti-
corruption policies. Lower corruption in the presence of a functioning financial system then is
the result of coordination failure among the corrupt officials. Interestingly, given that a banking
system exists, the information generated by screening not necessarily reduces the corruption
level compared to the case where banks do not screen.
The paper is organized as follows: Next, in section 2 we discuss the related literature. In
section 3, we empirically relate the development of financial institutions to the corruption level
in transition countries. Furthermore, we study corruption and the market for lucrative jobs in
developing countries. In section 4, we set up the model and discuss the differences between
the cases with and without a functioning financial sector. In section 5, we study the effects of
financial institutions on corruption. For this, we first develop our probabilistic voting model on
anti-corruption policies. We derive and then compare the equilibrium corruption level for our
different scenarios with and without financial institutions. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Our paper is related to two different strands of literature. The first strand analyzes the effects
of institutions on economic activity: La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (LLSV)
show in a series of papers that legal institutions affect both the financing decisions of firms and
corporate governance (LLSV 1997, 1998, 2000). Pagano and Volpin (2005) stress the importance
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of political institutions: Proportional electoral systems lead to weaker investor protection than
majoritarian systems. Some authors consider the impact of institutions on corruption. Political
institutions determine legal institutions as well as the incidence of corruption (Myerson 1993,
Persson and Tabellini, 1999 and 2000, Chpt. 9). Persson, Tabellini, and Trebbi (2003) empiri-
cally confirm that proportional electoral systems are likely to have higher corruption levels than
majoritarian systems. More generally, Treisman (2000) finds in his empirical study that more
developed economies and countries with a longer exposure to democracy are less corrupt. It is
particularly interesting to study the persistence of corruption in a democratic regime as there,
opposition to a corrupt system has the most influence. Empirically, corruption has been the
decisive issue in the national elections in many developing countries (Worldbank, 2000). Some
recent examples are the Ukraine (2004), Kenya (2003), or Pakistan (2002) (source: BBC).
Our model takes the causality one step further as we argue that financial institutions shape
the policy preferences of the constituents by offering them a broader set of financing opportu-
nities. Through this channel, the political support for anti-corruption measures increases with
the effectiveness of financial institutions. Hoff and Stiglitz (2004) model the endogenous devel-
opment of market-supporting institutions in the political process. In our analysis, we take the
quality of financial institutions as exogenously given.
The second strand of literature considers the issue of corruption explicitly.2 Empirical stud-
ies show a negative correlation between corruption and growth (Mauro, 1995, Knack and Keefer,
1995). An explanation for this is offered by Abed and Davoodi (2002). For transition countries,
they empirically show that structural reforms are more important than corruption for deter-
mining a country’s growth rate. Yet, the lack of structural and institutional reforms may also
give rise to more corruption. The theoretical literature provides explanations for these negative
consequences of corruption.3 Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1991), and Shleifer and Vishny
(1993) show how corruption distorts the allocation of input factors, thus leading to economic
stagnation. A reason for the negative impact of corruption on investment is given by Foellmi
2For literature surveys on corruption see Bardhan (1997), Jain (2001a), and Aidt (2003). For edited volumes
on corruption, see Jain (1998) and Jain (2001b).
3Initially, the theoretical literature on corruption emphasized the positive effect of the officials’ opportunistic
behavior on allocative efficiency (Lui, 1985, Beck and Maher, 1986). Rose-Ackerman (1999) discusses these
arguments.
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and Oechslin (2006). With imperfect financial markets, firms receive credit only if they can offer
sufficient collateral. However, firms have to pay bribes to start a business. This reduces the
available collateral and drives firms with intermediate wealth out of the credit market.
Closely related to our approach is the literature that views high corruption levels as the
result of a coordination failure. Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1993) show that a coordination
failure may arise due to production externalities: When more resources are allocated to rent-
seeking, returns to productive activities fall faster than returns to rent-seeking. Thus, the
opportunity costs of further rent-seeking are reduced, making it more attractive. In a different
context, Acemoglu (1995) argues that rent-seeking exerts a negative externality on rewards to
talent, resulting in inefficient allocations of talent to unproductive activities. In our model, the
persistence of corruption is the result of a coordination failure due to political externalities.
The agents’ incentives to support anti-corruption measures are determined by their investment
opportunities which, in turn, depend on the existence of a functioning financial system. In
the absence of financial institutions, it is individually rational for citizens to invest in activities
linked to corruption and then support policies that protect these rents.
In the literature, the predominant cause for corruption at the lower levels of the bureaucracy
is seen in the principal-agent relationship between bureaucrats and their superiors. While in
most of this literature, the different levels of the bureaucracy at which corruption occurs are
studied separately, there are a few exceptions. Hillman and Katz (1987) show that rent seeking
provokes contests for the positions that grant authority to appropriate the transfers made in the
initial rent-seeking contest. This creates further social costs. Bac (1996a, 1996b) argues that
if low-level bureaucrats are monitored, they may collude with their superior by paying him ex
ante or by transferring a proportion of their revenues from corruption to him in order to avoid
punishment. In line with the models on corruption in hierarchies, we argue that administrative
corruption spreads over several levels of the bureaucracy as corrupt officials have to pay an entry
fee.
The so-called low-level corruption can be limited through better administrative and legal
institutions. One of these measures is the design of the wage structure (see Acemoglu and
Verdier, 1998 and 2000, and Besley and McLaren, 1993). Other important measures are the
monitoring of low-level bureaucrats in an administration as well as the design of the penalties if
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corruption is detected (Laffont and Guessan, 1999, Mookerjee and Png, 1995, Rose-Ackerman,
1975).
Most of the contributions mentioned assume principal-agent relations with benevolent prin-
cipals. A more pessimistic view is that the government officials as well as the top-level politicians
are corruptible (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1998). In democratic regimes, self-interested politicians
will only have incentives to implement anti-corruption policies if there is widespread political
support for such measures.4 When we observe persistent high corruption levels, we thus have to
explain the absence of this political support. In our model, we argue that the lack of financial
institutions gives more members of the population a benefit from corruption. To the best of
our knowledge, the role of financing the entry fee has not been analyzed so far. When corrupt
officials have to resort to other citizens to finance the entry fee, additional groups of voters have
a stake in corruption. This reduces the political support for anti-corruption campaigns.
3 Corruption, Financial Institutions, and Entry Fees
The empirical literature suggests that countries with better institutions are less corrupt (Abed
and Davoodi, 2002). We investigate the relationship between financial institutions and corrup-
tion using cross-sectional data for transition countries. They provide an ideal study ground as
they are heterogenous with respect to financial development. The quality of financial institu-
tions is measured by the degree of financial intermediation, i.e., the ratio of credit to the private
sector to GDP. To capture the level of corruption in a country, we take the corruption perception
index (CPI) by Transparency International. Using the Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient,
we find a clear positive correlation between the degree of financial intermediation and the CPI
score which is significant at the 5 percent level. This is consistent with the hypothesis that
better financial institutions reduce corruption. Our finding is illustrated in figure 1.5
[Figure 1 about here.]
A possible link between financial institutions and the incidence of corruption in a country is
the mode of financing the entry fee for lucrative positions in the bureaucracy. There is evidence
4An empirical study on Uganda shows that providing the population with information and thus improving
their ability to monitor corrupt officials reduces embezzlement dramatically (Reinikka and Svensson, 2004).
5When using the EBRD index on banking sector reform as an alternative measure for the quality of financial
institutions, we get similar results. Also, our findings are confirmed in the regression analysis.
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from several developing countries that bureaucrats who obtain a lucrative job have to pay entry
fees. In turn, officials have to be bribed for a variety of services. A Worldbank survey (1998)
conducted among 350 enterprises in Georgia indicates that most instances of corruption occur
in the following areas: tax and financial inspections, border crossing at customs, water and
electricity services, fire and sanitary inspections, and contacts with the road police. According
to this survey, 71% of the enterprises would be willing to pay higher taxes if corruption was
eliminated. Those enterprises that indicate their willingness to pay higher taxes would pay
additional taxes of up to 22% of their revenues in order to eliminate corruption. These figures
indicate that the total amount of bribes paid by enterprises must be substantial. This is reflected
in Georgia’s position in the Transparency International ranking of the CPI. It lists countries
according to their CPI scores where the country with the lowest perceived corruption level has
the highest score. In 2002, Georgia was ranked 85 of 102.
For the officials, the bribes translate into high rents from office. The existence of entry
fees for positions in the bureaucracy is well known not only among the officials but also in the
general public. The entry fee increases with the amount of bribes that can be appropriated in
a particular position. In Georgia, the percentage of public officials believed to have purchased
their position exceeds 50% for customs and tax inspectors. More than one third of the positions
of natural resource licensers, judges, investigators, and prosecutors are believed to have been
purchased (Worldbank, 1998).6
The seminal article on the market for public office is by Wade (1982). In several periods
of fieldwork, he collected evidence for the “corruption system” found in the canal irrigation
industry in India. India still is among the most corrupt countries of the world (in 2002, India
was on rank 71 of the Transparency International CPI ranking). There are two sources of revenue
for the officials: First, they may embezzle money from the budget that each canal division gets
for financing the maintenance work. Second, irrigators pay the officials in order to ensure the
water supply either for the whole season or for emergencies. On average, an Assistant Engineer
receives an additional annual income from bribes of about 3.5 times his official annual wage.
Each year, an Executive Engineer earns about 9 times his official annual salary from bribes.
6Entry fees are widespread in the health sector as well. In Ghana about 25 per cent of jobs are bought in
government hospitals (Lewis, 2006). Similar figures are provided for Uganda (Azfar, Kahkonen and Meagher,
2001)
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Senior officers and politicians appropriate part of the engineers’ additional income by de-
manding an entry fee for assigning them a particular position. The entry fee that an engineer
has to pay depends on the productivity of the area where his position is located. In the uplands,
it costs an Executive Engineer about three times his official annual wage to get a position with
a two-year tenure. In contrast, on the fertile deltas, the entry fee can be up to about 14 times
his annual salary.
In many developing countries, firms resort to the informal credit market and finance new
investments by borrowing from family and friends (Safavian, Fleisig, and Steinbuks, 2006). This
implies that access to bank loans is even more difficult for individuals. Often their only source
to obtain finance is borrowing from relatives.
We base our model on these observations, i.e., we take for granted that an entry fee for
lucrative positions has to be paid. We show that the entry fees may be the link between the
level of financial development and the corruption level in a country. Access to bank loans
determines the possibilities of financing the entry fee. Thus, the quality of the financial system
shapes the political preferences of different groups of voters and affects the political support for
anti-corruption campaigns.
4 Financing the Entry Fee
For the basic setup of the model, we describe the economy, the financial institutions, and their
impact on the financing of the entry fees. We compare different cases: First, we look at an
economic system without functioning financial institutions. Second, we introduce functioning
financial institutions. In the second case, we focus on the role of banks. On the one hand, banks
take interest-bearing deposits. On the other hand, they grant loans. For the credit market, we
set up two different scenarios: Banks either have access to a perfect screening technology or they
are not able to screen at all.
4.1 The Model
The economy with total population size n consists of four groups of citizens: The depositors D,
the corrupt officials K, the relatives R of the corrupt officials, and the superiors S of the corrupt
officials. Each group has αJn identical individuals, where αJ , J = {D,K,R, S}, denotes the
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share of a particular group. Each citizen has the same initial endowment A, A > 0. There is no
depreciation.
All groups of citizens suffer equally from corruption. The disutility from corruption is given
by −u(c), where u(c) > 0. It does not only capture the costs of the bribe but also other negative
aspects of corruption such as time lags in getting services, the non-enforceability of services for
which bribes have been paid and the psychological costs involved. We assume that these costs
grow with the level of corruption c, such that ∂u(c)∂c > 0 and
∂2u(c)
(∂c)2
> 0. Note that the corrupt
officials suffer under corruption like all the others, as they also need other services except for
the one which they themselves are providing.7
Depositors. The depositors want to invest their endowment in order to earn returns on their
assets. They can do this only on the formal credit market. On the informal credit market,
there exist high transaction costs, which can only be overcome by family ties.8 However, the
depositors do not have relatives whom they could lend to.
Corrupt Officials. All citizens have to pay a bribe if they use any of the public services
offered by the officials. Each corrupt official can collect a bribe c, c ≥ 0, from everyone who
demands that certain public service that he is providing. This fraction of the population is
denoted by σ ∈ [0; 1]. We assume the σ to be exogenously given. The total amount of bribes
each corrupt official can collect thus amounts to σ(n− 1)c. This is of course a simplification: In
reality, some services and positions might be more lucrative than others (see section 3).
In order to focus on how the mode of financing the entry fee influences the political choice of
the corruption level c, we take the number of positions in the bureaucracy as given. The group
of citizens who have obtained these positions is called the group of corrupt officials K. Due to
the corruption rent, these positions are so attractive that the superiors can demand an entry fee
for each of them.9 The size of the entry fee T (c) > 0 depends on the amount of rents that public
7Our results would be qualitatively unaffected by the alternative assumption that corrupt officials do not suffer
from corruption, i.e., u(c) = 0 for group K.
8In our model, transaction costs among relatives are set to zero. Yet, our results would be preserved as long
as transaction costs are low enough to allow interaction on the informal intra-family credit market.
9By demanding an entry fee, the superiors ensure that only persons with the appropriate skills and prefer-
ences apply for positions as public officials: Those who are non-corruptible or are unable to extract bribes from
their clientele will find the job in the bureaucracy unprofitable (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). With this selection
mechanism, the bureaucracy is composed solely of corrupt officials. For the purpose of the model, the presence of
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servants can extract from the other citizens. We choose a simple linear specification, T (c) = tc,
with t > 0. In our model, we do not endogenize the superiors’ choice of the size of the entry fee.
We assume that the entry fee is set in such a way that the corrupt officials get at least some
positive payoff from corruption.10
We require that A < T ≤ 2A. This implies that each corrupt official has to borrow some
amount from his relative or ask for a loan at the bank in order to finance the entry fee. Our
assumption makes sure that one relative has enough funds to pay the whole missing amount
for the entry fee. We allow each corrupt official to borrow from one relative only. If this
informal credit market is to be cleared, the group sizes of corrupt officials and relatives have to
be equal, i.e., αK = αR. For our model, this is the most restrictive case: The group of voters
that potentially have a positive stake in corruption is minimized. If each corrupt official could
borrow from several relatives, more voters would receive a positive, albeit smaller, revenue from
corruption. Only in the extreme, with perfect competition among the relatives, would their rent
from corruption be reduced to zero. Note that the superiors could always get at least a payment
of A from the corrupt officials. Then, the corrupt officials would not need external sources of
financing. However, as the focus of this model is the effect of the different modes of financing
the entry fee on the level of corruption, we exclude this case.
Relatives. Relatives differ from the depositors in that they have a corrupt official in their
close family. This is an advantage for them insofar as they have the opportunity to invest on
the informal credit market.
Superiors. The superiors collect the entry fees T (c) and put them into their private pockets.
As our focus does not lie on this group, we assume that they are of mass 0, i.e., αS = 0. Note
further that the superiors cannot lend to the corrupt officials as the transaction costs on the
informal credit market can only be overcome by family ties. We assume that they spend their
revenues on consumption.
additional non-corrupt officials would not alter the results as this group of voters would not have a positive stake
in corruption.
10In an earlier version of this paper, we endogenize the superiors’ choice of the size of the entry fee. We show
that they actually have the incentive to leave a positive rent from corruption to the corrupt officials, if they are
able to coordinate in any way. The reason is that they want to reduce the corrupt officials’ support for anti-
corruption policies. Therefore, we can exclude the case where competition for positions drives the entry fees up
and the rents of the corrupt officials down to zero.
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The time structure of the model is as follows: In period 1, the level of corruption c is
determined in the elections (for the time structure of the election subgame see section 5.1). In
period 2, the corrupt officials decide on the financing of the entry fee T (c). In period 3, the
corruption level realizes, the bribes are collected and individuals receive their payoffs. The time
structure is depicted in figure 2. Since the game is solved by backward induction, we start with
the decision of how to finance the entry fee.
Figure 2: Time Structure
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
Election Decision on
financing T
Corruption level and
payoffs realize
H
t

4.2 The Economy without Financial Institutions
In this section, we study the case where no financial institutions exists.
Depositors. When there are no financial institutions, the depositors have no possibility to
invest their initial endowment. They do not have access to the informal credit market as they
are not relatives of a corrupt official. Thus, the utility function of each depositor is composed of
his initial endowment and of his losses from corruption. His utility is given by UND (c) = A−u(c),
where the superscripts N denote the utility levels in the case with no financial institutions.
Corrupt Officials. The corrupt officials receive bribes of the amount of σ(n− 1)c.11 In order
to get access to their jobs, the corrupt officials have to pay the entry fee T (c) = tc to their
superiors. To finance this fee, the corrupt officials need some funds in addition to their initial
endowment A. The corrupt officials borrow the amount (tc−A) from the relatives and repay
11Note that certain restrictions have to be imposed on σ to ensure that the revenues from corruption equal the
sum of bribes paid in the economy. The revenues from corruption depend on σ, i.e., on how many individuals
use each particular service. The sum of bribes paid, in turn, depends on how many services each individual uses.
Assume each citizen uses φ services. The total revenues from corruption are σ(n− 1)cαKn. These have to equal
the sum of bribes paid by all citizens, i.e., cnφ. Thus, we need σ = φ
(n−1)αK . This model uses the disutility
function −u(c) to capture the costs from corruption for each individual. Here, φ is implicitly included.
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(1 + bN )(tc − A). The term bN is equivalent to the interest rate on the informal credit market
and is determined in a Nash bargaining game among the pairs of corrupt officials and relatives.
We assume equal bargaining power of corrupt officials and relatives. The utility of the corrupt
officials when there are no financial institutions is:
UNK (c) = σ(n− 1)c− (1 + bN )(tc−A)− u(c) (1)
Relatives. The relatives receive the interest rate bN on the amount of capital which they
lend to their corrupt family members. Their utility is thus:
UNR (c) = A+ b
N (tc−A)− u(c) (2)
When bargaining over bN , the corrupt official and the relative have the same disagreement
payoff A− u(c). If negotiations break down, the relative has no possibility to invest his endow-
ment. Neither does the corrupt official have the possibility to obtain the job. As a result, both
parties become depositors. We can state the following result for the bargaining game in the case
without financial institutions:
Proposition 1 Without functioning financial institutions, the relatives lend to the corrupt of-
ficials on the informal credit market and receive the interest rate bN on their loan, where
bN =
[σ(n− 1)− t]c
2(tc−A) . (3)
Proof. In the Nash bargaining solution with symmetric bargaining power, bN maximizes
the surplus that is then split evenly among the two parties. Formally, the solution is given by:
bN = argmax
[(
UNK (c)− UND (c)
) (
UNR (c)− UND (c)
)]
This yields the following first-order condition:
∂UNR
∂bN
(
UNK (c)− UND (c)
)
+
∂UNK
∂bN
(
UNR (c)− UND (c)
)
= 0
Inserting the utility functions and simplifying, we get:
σ(n− 1)c− (1 + bN )(tc−A)− u(c) = A+ bN (tc−A)− u(c)
Solving for bN , this yields bN = [σ(n−1)−t]c2(tc−A) .
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In the case without functioning financial institutions, corrupt officials and relatives have the
same disagreement payoff and share the net surplus from corruption equally. Their utility levels
after the bargaining are thus equal:
UNK (c) = U
N
R (c) =
1
2
[σ(n− 1)− t]c+A− u(c) (4)
As discussed above, there must be a net surplus of corruption that can be split in the
bargaining game. That is, the upper bound for t is given by [σ(n − 1) − t]c > 0. Each party
gets its disagreement payoff and a positive revenue on top of that. Otherwise, the positions in
the bureaucracy would cease to be attractive. Thus, in the case without functioning financial
institutions, the range of t is defined by A < tc < σ(n− 1)c.
4.3 The Economy with Financial Institutions
Next, we introduce financial institutions in the economy. To keep the analysis of the financial
sector tractable, we study a small open economy. Therefore, the interest rate r is determined
by the world market and is identical for deposits and loans. In the following, we distinguish
two different scenarios for the credit market: In the first case, banks are able to screen the
borrowers. This allows them to deny credit to any borrower who intends to finance an entry
fee for a position in the bureaucracy. In the second case, banks are not able to screen and offer
a pooling contract to all applicants, including corrupt officials, at the rate r. For notational
clarity, we denote utilities with the superscript S or P when the citizens use the formal credit
market and go to the bank that offers screening or pooling contracts, respectively. When citizens
decide to use the informal credit market although a banking sector is present and functioning,
we use the superscripts IS or IP .
Depositors. The depositors can save their endowment on the formal credit market. They
still suffer under corruption. Their utility with a functioning financial system is:
USD (c) = U
P
D (c) = (1 + r)A− u(c) (5)
4.3.1 Perfect Screening
We start with the scenario in which the banks are able to screen perfectly. Banks receive perfect
signals about their creditors without incurring any costs and can thus exclude corrupt officials
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as creditors.12 As a result, they offer credit only to non-corrupt investors at the world market
interest rate r. In practice, the screening process could, for example, involve that banks demand
a business plan from potential borrowers in order to evaluate their investment projects. Corrupt
officials have no possibility to get credit as they are unable to provide a business plan.
Many international banks find it optimal to subscribe to a code of ethics. There, they commit
themselves to refusing all interactions that could be linked to corruption.13 This may give a
bank a competitive advantage by improving its reputation and by avoiding costs when dealing
with the supervisory authority.
Corrupt Officials. If the corrupt officials do not borrow from their relatives, they are not
able to pay the entry fee and remain depositors. Therefore, their outside option amounts to
USK (c) = (1 + r)A − u(c). For the corrupt officials, still the only way to finance the entry fee
is to borrow from their relatives. In this case, we denote the bargaining outcome by bS . The
relatives, just like the corrupt officials, now have the outside option to save at the bank at the
rate r. The utility of the corrupt officials when they borrow from their relatives is:
U ISK (c) = σ (n− 1) c−
(
1 + bS
)
(tc−A)− u(c) (6)
Relatives. The relatives have the choice to save at the bank or to lend to the corrupt
officials. If the relatives save their whole initial endowment at the bank, their utility is USR (c) =
(1 + r)A − u(c). If they decide to lend to the corrupt officials, they earn the rate bS on the
amount that they lend. For the rest of their endowment, i.e., 2A − tc, they receive the rate r
from the bank. Their utility is:
U ISR (c) = A+ b
S (tc−A) + r (2A− tc)− u(c) (7)
In the case with screening, we can state the following result for the bargaining game:
12We do not consider the possibility that banks may only be able to screen partially. Including this would not
lead to any substantially new results but to a hybrid of the results of the two extreme cases pooling and perfect
screening.
13For example, twelve global banks form the Wolfsberg Group. Its members promote, in collaboration with
Transparency International, anti money-laundering principles and published statements on the financing of ter-
rorism and on monitoring, screening and searching (http://www.wolfsberg-principles.com). For another example
from Russia, see www.imb.ru/en/about/ethics code.htm.
13
Proposition 2 If banks are able to screen perfectly, the relatives lend to the corrupt officials on
the informal credit market and receive the interest rate bS on their loan, where
bS =
(n− 1)σc− tc (1− r)− 2rA
2 (tc−A) . (8)
Proof. See the Appendix.
After the bargaining, the utility functions in the situation where banks screen are identical
for corrupt officials and relatives:
USK (c) = U
S
R (c) =
1
2
[σ (n− 1)− (1 + r) t] c+ (1 + r)A− u(c) (9)
In the case with perfect screening, the upper bound for T is given by [σ(n−1)−(1+r)t]c > 0.
If this condition is fulfilled, we also have that bS > r. In the case with functioning financial
institutions, the range of t is defined by A < tc < σ(n−1)1+r c.
How does a functioning financial sector alter the result of the bargaining game? Given our
assumption tc < 2A, we can show that the equivalent of the interest rate on the informal credit
market decreases with respect to the case without banks, i.e., bS < bN :
(n− 1)σc− tc(1− r)− 2rA < [σ(n− 1)− t]c⇔ r(tc− 2A) < 0 (10)
Here, we can see two effects: First, the existence of a functioning banking sector when banks
screen reduces the net surplus from corruption by (1+r)tc as both relatives and corrupt officials
have the outside option to save at the bank. Second, the interest rate on the informal credit
market decreases. The relatives now have an additional opportunity to save whatever they do
not lend to the corrupt officials, i.e., 2A − tc, at the bank at the rate r. In symmetric Nash
bargaining, the relatives have to compensate the corrupt officials for their additional gain of
r(2A− tc) from saving at the bank.
4.3.2 No Screening Possible
With a functioning financial system, both corrupt officials and relatives can save at the bank.
When banks cannot screen, they serve all borrowers and offer a pooling contract at the rate r.
Corrupt Officials. Now, the corrupt officials can borrow the amount tc − A > 0 from the
bank. They have to pay the interest rate r on their loan. The utility of the corrupt officials
when they borrow on the formal credit market is:
UPK (c) = σ(n− 1)c− (1 + r)(tc−A)− u(c) (11)
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When they use the informal credit market, the outside option to borrow from the bank
affects the disagreement utilities of the corrupt officials. We denote the bargaining outcome in
presence of a bank that offers a pooling contract with bP . The utility of the corrupt officials if
they borrow from their relatives is:
U IPK (c) = σ(n− 1)c− (1 + bP )(tc−A)− u(c) (12)
Relatives. The relatives can save at the bank or lend to the corrupt officials. When the
relatives invest only in the formal credit market, they get UPR (c) = (1 + r)A − u(c). When the
relatives decide to stay in the informal credit market, they receive the rate bP for the amount
(tc − A) that they lend to the corrupt officials. They can save the rest of their endowment,
2A − tc, at the bank at the rate r. When the relatives decide to stay in the informal credit
market and lend to the corrupt officials, their utility is given by:
U IPR (c) = A+ b
P (tc−A) + r(2A− tc)− u(c) (13)
In the bargaining game, the disagreement payoffs of both corrupt officials and relatives are
given by UPK (c) and U
P
R (c). Since the disagreement payoffs differ for the two parties, their
incentives to make concessions in the bargaining game change, too. In the case where banks
offer pooling contracts, we can state the following result:
Proposition 3 In the economy with functioning financial institutions where banks offer pooling
contracts, the Nash bargaining solution yields bP = r.
Proof. See the Appendix.
When bargaining on the informal credit market, both groups receive exactly the same utility
level as when they use the bank. The only interest rate in this economy is the world market
rate r. The corrupt officials have the outside option to take a bank loan to finance the entry
fee. Individually, each corrupt official is indifferent between using the bank or borrowing from
his relative. Bargaining does not create any additional surplus. We will discuss the effects
of this on the political equilibrium in section 5. Note that it is irrelevant whether or not the
corrupt officials actually use the bank. The relatives always get the same utility level. Thus,
their interest in the level of corruption is identical to that of the depositors. Both groups only
experience costs from corruption.
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5 Financial Institutions and Anti-Corruption Policies
We are interested in how the different modes of financing the entry fee affect the corruption level
in our economy. The corruption level is determined in the political process. When voters prefer
low corruption levels, they demand anti-corruption policies. We first set out our probabilistic
voting model of political decision-making. Then, we derive the political equilibrium and compare
the equilibrium corruption levels in different scenarios with and without financial institutions.
5.1 Voting on Anti-Corruption Policies
In this section, we describe how the level of corruption is determined in the political process. We
use a probabilistic voting model. There are two candidates, X and Y, running for election. The
policy platform on which the candidates run for office is the corruption level in the economy. Each
of the two candidates strives to get the majority of votes in the population.14 The candidate who
wins the majority of votes implements his proposed policy. We abstract from possible difficulties
and costs of implementing the politically desired corruption level.15 Moreover, we assume, as
is standard in this literature, that politicians are able to commit perfectly to their announced
policy platforms. A probabilistic voting approach allows us to capture the uncertainty that is an
issue in real-world elections. Politicians do not have perfect information about the preferences
of individual voters. In the model, the politicians design their policy platforms on the basis of
their expectations about the political responsiveness of the different groups of the electorate.
In addition, the model has the advantage of incorporating the voters’ political responsiveness
to marginal policy changes. In contrast to a median voter model, it does not only consider the
individual votes but also takes into account how much this policy matters for the different groups
of voters. The politicians cater most to those groups of the electorate whom they perceive to
be most responsive to a change in their policy platforms, i.e., the corruption level. Thus, the
model does not preclude high corruption levels even when the majority of voters suffers from
14Similarly, we could assume that the candidates maximize their probabilities of winning the elections, that is,
the probabilities of getting the majority of votes (see, e.g., Persson and Tabellini, 2000). As shown in Lindbeck
and Weibull (1987), under fairly general conditions, the maximization problem for the candidates is then similar
to the problem of maximizing the vote shares. These conditions are fulfilled by the assumptions in this model.
15Introducing costs of reducing corruption for the politicians would preserve our results as long as these costs
are similar in all our scenarios.
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corruption.16
As we assume that the superiors are a very small group, i.e., αS = 0, they do not have
any political influence. Thus, we have to consider three groups of voters: depositors, corrupt
officials and relatives. Each group of voters is a fraction αJ of the total population with J =
{D,K,R} and ∑J αJ = 1.17 Individuals base their voting decision on two elements: First, they
consider their utility from the candidates’ announced platform, in particular, the corruption
policy UJ(c). Second, their voting decision is also influenced by their ideology or fixed preferences
for other policy issues, which candidates do not include in their policy platform. In group J ,
voter i’s ideological preference for candidate Y is given by the individual-specific parameter
siJ . The individual ideology parameters are uniformly distributed in each group according to
siJ ∼ [− 12SJ ; 12SJ ]. Generally, the more siJ differs from 0, the stronger the ideology component
in the citizen’s voting decision is. A citizen with a strong idelogical bias is less responsive to
changes in the policy platforms cX and cY announced by the candidates.
The time structure for the elections is as follows: In the first time period, the two candidates
announce their policy platforms cX and cY . The candidates know the voters’ policy preferences
UJ(c) and the distributions for siJ . They do not know the realizations of the siJ . After an-
nouncing the policy platforms, candidates observe the realizations of the siJ . In the following
time period, elections are held. The candidate with the majority of votes wins the elections. He
implements the policy platform that he has announced.
Taking into account all the components which influence the election decision of voter i in
group J , voter i prefers candidate X if and only if UJ(cX) > UJ(cY ) + siJ . Candidates are
interested in identifying how easily voters of a group will switch to vote for them in response
to a marginal policy change. For each group, the “swing voter”, i.e., the voter who is exactly
indifferent between voting for candidate X or Y , is identified by the condition:
sJ = UJ(cX)− UJ(cY ) (14)
Integrating over the ideological biases within groups and summing over all groups gives us
16Dixit and Londregan (1996) discuss the importance of the voters’ responsiveness to a policy change in the
context of redistributive politics.
17We do not consider that the superiors might be able to exert pressure on political decision makers in favor
of corruption. It can be shown that all results of this paper still hold when the superiors are an active political
group.
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the vote share for candidate X as a function of the policy platforms cX and cY :18
vX =
∑
J
αJSJ
(
sJ +
1
2SJ
)
=
∑
J
αJSJ
(
UJ(cX)− UJ(cY ) + 12SJ
)
(15)
Each candidate chooses his policy platform c in order to maximize his vote share v. We can
state the following general result.
Proposition 4 For each parameter constellation, both candidates choose the same uniquely
defined policy platform c∗. It is determined by the condition
∂v
∂c
= 0 ⇐⇒
∑
J
αJSJ
∂UJ(c)
∂c
= 0. (16)
Proof. For each parameter constellation, we have a unique equilibrium if the vote shares
of candidates X and Y are strictly concave functions of the policy platforms cX and cY (see
Coughlin and Nitzan, 1981, or Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987). In our setup, this is straightforward
as the utility functions of all groups are linearly additive and comprised of terms which are linear
in c, and the disutility from corruption −u(c) where −∂2u(c)(∂c) (c) < 0. Therefore, ∂
2v
(∂c)2
< 0.
In order to derive the equilibrium corruption levels, we insert the utility functions of all
groups. We do this in section 4.2. and 4.3. We then compare the equilibrium corruption levels
in order to derive conditions under which functioning financial institutions reduce corruption.
5.2 Corruption Level without Financial Institutions
The following lemma describes the policy choice without financial institutions:
Lemma 1 If no banks exist, the candidates propose a policy platform that determines an equi-
librium corruption level c∗N , implicitly defined by
∂u(c∗N )
∂c
=
(αRSR + αKSK)
[
σ(n−1)−t
2
]
∑
J αJSJ
(17)
with J ∈ {D,K,R}.
On the left hand side of equation (17), we see the marginal disutility from corruption. It
is identical for all groups. In the denominator of the right hand side, we find the groups that
suffer under corruption. As all citizens suffer equally under corruption, this is the sum over all
18For candidate Y , the vote share is derived similarly by integrating over all voters with a siJ higher than sJ
and summing over all groups: vY =
∑
J
αJSJ
(
1
2SJ
− sJ
)
=
∑
J
αJSJ
(
UJ(cY )− UJ(cX) + 12SJ
)
.
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groups, weighted with the political responsiveness of the group SJ and the group’s size αJ . The
components of the marginal utility in the numerator of the right hand side stem from those
groups that have a positive interest in corruption: The relatives, whose earnings on the informal
credit market depend positively on the corruption level, and the corrupt officials, who get a
positive surplus from collecting bribes in their position. Comparative statics show that the
equilibrium corruption level decreases as the entry fee increases. The more the corrupt officials
have to pay for their jobs, the lower the net surplus of corruption is. Then, the relatives and the
corrupt officials have a lower marginal benefit from an increasing corruption level and are more
supportive of anti-corruption policies. Note that the depositors show up only in the denominator
as they do not have any positive revenue from corruption.
5.3 Corruption Level with Financial Institutions
Next, we derive the equilibrium corruption levels with functioning financial institutions.
5.3.1 Perfect Screening
The following lemma describes the policy choice if banks screen their borrowers:
Lemma 2 If banks possess a perfect screening technology, the candidates propose a policy plat-
form that determines an equilibrium corruption level c∗S, implicitly defined by
∂u(c∗S)
∂c
=
(αRSR + αKSK)
[
σ(n−1)−(1+r)t
2
]
∑
J αJSJ
. (18)
Proof. See the Appendix.
As before, corrupt officials and relatives use the informal credit market. Also, relatives save
the part of their endowment that they do not lend to corrupt officials at the bank. Thus, the
relatives have a positive stake in corruption because they lend to the corrupt officials on the
informal credit market where they earn bS > r. However, relatives face a coordination problem:
If they could coordinate on saving at the bank, this would reduce the political support for
corruption and would lead to a lower equilibrium corruption level. Individually, however, it is
optimal for each relative to lend to a corrupt official at the rate bS > r: If all other relatives
also lend to corrupt officials, the corruption level is high anyway. Similarly, the corruption level
remains low if all other relatives save at the bank, even if a single relative lends to a corrupt
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official. As the effect of a single voter on the election outcome is negligible, the individual
decision to stay in the informal credit market does not alter the equilibrium corruption level.
5.3.2 No Screening Possible
The following lemma describes the policy choice if banks are not able to detect corrupt officials:
Lemma 3 If banks offer pooling contracts, the candidates propose a policy platform that deter-
mines an equilibrium corruption level c∗P , implicitly defined by
∂u(c∗P )
∂c
=
αKSK [σ (n− 1)− (1 + r) t]∑
J αJSJ
. (19)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Now, only the corrupt officials get a positive rent from corruption. Note again that for this
result, it is irrelevant whether the corrupt officials use the bank or not. The relatives do not
have a positive stake in corruption anymore. They receive the interest rate r on their total
asset endowment independent of whether they invest on the formal or informal credit market.
Therefore, they are missing from the numerator of the expression.
The corrupt officials are in a prisoners’ dilemma-like situation. In the aggregate, they would
prefer to use the informal credit market and borrow from their relatives while giving them a
higher interest rate than the bank. They would then have allies in the elections: If relatives had
a stake in corruption, they would vote against possible anti-corruption measures. Individually,
however, the strategy to win over a relative by offering him a rate bP > r is not optimal for a
corrupt official: Suppose that all corrupt officials are borrowing from the bank. Official k has no
incentive to switch to the informal credit market and offer a rate higher than r to his relative.
The relative would agree to lend to the corrupt official when offered a higher rate than from the
bank. Yet, the corrupt official would only win over one voter to the pro-corruption side. This
one vote does not change the corruption level chosen by the politician. Next, suppose that all
other corrupt officials borrow from their relatives at a rate bP > r. Then, it pays for official
k to switch to the formal credit market because he can then borrow at a lower rate. As all
others stay in the informal credit market, the corruption level does not decrease. Thus, each
corrupt official individually has the incentive to switch to the formal credit market or to lower
the rate he offers to the relative to bP = r. Therefore, the relatives do not get any additional
surplus from lending in the informal credit market. This means that the corrupt officials cannot
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coordinate to give the relatives a stake in corruption and remain the only group of voters with
a positive interest in corruption.
5.4 The Impact of Introducing Financial Institutions on the Corruption Level
To evaluate the effect of financial institutions on corruption, we compare the corruption levels
for the cases with and without banks.
Proposition 5 If banks possess a perfect screening technology, the corruption level with func-
tioning financial institutions is always lower than the corruption level without financial institu-
tions,i.e., c∗N > c
∗
S.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In the case without banks as well as in the case with banks that are able to screen, the entry
fee is financed via the informal credit market. Corrupt officials and relatives share the revenues
from corruption in both cases. How does the existence of a functioning banking sector then
decrease the equilibrium corruption level? When there are banks, corrupt officials and relatives
have the option to save at the bank. Thus, the relatives incur some opportunity costs if they
decide to lend to the corrupt officials. When sharing the surplus from corruption, the corrupt
officials and the relatives take these opportunity costs into account. Moreover, both groups now
have better outside options as they can earn the interest rate r on their endowment when they
become depositors. For both groups, this decreases the marginal net benefit from corruption.
In the situation with banks and screening, both groups are less responsive to a change in the
corruption level than in the situation without banks. As a consequence, the politicians cater
less to these groups. The equilibrium corruption level is reduced.
In general, the existence of depositors decreases the level of corruption. Since they suffer
under corruption, they support anti-corruption policies. As they always only suffer under cor-
ruption, their utilities enter the first order condition for the optimal policy choice exactly in the
same way in the cases with and without financial institutions. Hence, for the comparison of one
situation to the other they do not play a role, regardless of their share in the population αD or
their political responsiveness SD.
What happens if banks are unable to screen and the corrupt officials have access to the
formal credit market?
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Proposition 6 If banks offer a pooling contract, the corruption level with functioning financial
institutions is lower than the corruption level without these institutions, i.e., c∗P < c
∗
N , if and
only if
SK
[
σ (n− 1)− t
2
− rt
]
< SR
[
σ (n− 1)− t
2
]
. (20)
Proof. See the Appendix.
All costs and benefits from corruption are weighted with the political importance of the
groups of voters, that is, the group size αJ and the group’s political responsiveness SJ . This
was demonstrated in lemmas 1 - 3. The higher SJ , the more swing voters a group has and
the more politicians cater to this group. Due to our assumption that αK = αR, the group
sizes cancel out in condition (20). Compare the terms in square brackets, i.e., the changes
in marginal net benefits from corruption when the economy switches from a situation without
financial institutions to a situation where banks offer pooling contracts. The left hand side of
condition (20) shows the resulting change of marginal net benefits for the corrupt officials. If
banks exists, all revenues from corruption are reaped by the corrupt officials: As they finance
the entry fee by taking a bank loan, they do not have to share the revenues from corruption.
Comparing the marginal utility to the case without financial institutions, they therefore receive
an additional half of the surplus from corruption, σ(n−1)−t2 . Yet, they have to bear the marginal
cost rt of financing the entry fee through a bank loan. The expression on the right hand side
shows that in the presence of banks, the relatives lose their half of the marginal net return on
corruption, i.e., σ(n−1)−t2 . It is obvious that with banks, the relatives’ marginal utility from
corruption decreases more than the corrupt officials’ marginal utility increases.
Consider first the case where both groups have the same responsiveness to a marginal policy
change, that is SK = SR. It is then clear that financial institutions lead to a lower equilibrium
corruption level: In the presence of banks that offer pooling contracts, the relatives lose all
their gains from corruption, and they become strict supporters of anti-corruption policies. The
corrupt officials marginally gain less from a functioning financial system than the relatives lose.
If both groups have equal political power, this results in a lower corruption level when banks
offer pooling contracts. This effect is reinforced for SK < SR.19
19In this case, the relatives are more responsive to marginal changes in the policy variable than the corrupt
officials. The political responsiveness, or the importance that voters attach to anti-corruption policies, can be
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Now consider SK > SR. We can rewrite condition (20) as SR > SK
(
1− 2rtσ(n−1)−t
)
. We
know from the corrupt officials’ participation constraint that σ (n− 1) − t > 0. Therefore,
1− 2rtσ(n−1)−t ≤ 1. For t < σ(n−1)1+2r , the expression
(
1− 2rtσ(n−1)−t
)
is positive. Then, the entry fee
is low enough to give the corrupt officials a significant rent. This also implies that the marginal
revenue of the relatives is limited as the amount of the loans to the corrupt official is low. Only
then, and if corrupt officials are more responsive to announced changes in the corruption level
than relatives, financial institutions could exacerbate the situation and increase the equilibrium
corruption level. For t > σ(n−1)1+2r , which implies (1− 2rtσ(n−1)−t) < 0, a banking sector which offers
pooling contracts always decreases the equilibrium corruption level, irrespective of the relative
political influence of the groups of voters.
Our analysis shows that a financial sector where banks commit to screen perfectly unam-
biguously reduces the equilibrium corruption level. If banks offer pooling contracts, whether the
corruption level in the economy is reduced or not depends on the political power of the differ-
ent groups of voters: In most cases, the presence of functioning financial institutions decreases
corruption. Banks that are unable to screen reduce the political support for anti-corruption
policies only if the political influence of the corrupt officials compared to that of the relatives is
very high, and the entry fee is low.
5.5 Comparing Corruption Levels under Different Financial Institutions
The difference between a banking sector with screening and with pooling is the degree of infor-
mation produced and used by the banks. In the case of screening banks are better informed.
Does more information in the banking sector always lead to lower corruption levels? Or formu-
lated differently, does banking sector with screening or pooling reduce corruption more? We can
state
Proposition 7 The corruption level with functioning financial institutions is higher when banks
offer a screening contract than when banks offer a pooling contract, i.e., c∗S > c
∗
P , if and only if
SK < SR.
increased when the issue receives a lot of public attention, for example, when the news media publishes investi-
gations on corrupt government officials. Brunetti and Weder (2003) empirically show that an independent press
significantly decreases corruption levels. The reason they give is that corrupt behavior by government officials is
more likely to be discovered and criticized by a free press.
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Proof. See the Appendix.
At first sight, this result is surprising because we would expect that if banks possess more
information, the corruption level is always reduced more strongly. However, we find that if the
political weight of the corrupt officials is lower than that of the relatives, a banking sector with
more information is less effective in reducing corruption. The reason is that in the screening
system, both corrupt officials and relatives benefit from the corruption revenues whereas in
the pooling system, the corrupt officials reap all the benefits. A banking system that generates
more information through screening induces individuals to resort to the informal capital market.
Then the gain in marginal utility from the informal capital market that accrues to the relatives
is equal to the reduction in marginal utility the corrupt officials face as they have to share the
revenue from bribes with the relatives. Thus, if the relatives have a larger political weight, the
corruption level is higher in the case of screening.
6 Conclusion
The literature has studied corruption on the low levels of the administration and on the high lev-
els of government separately. However, both types of corruption are linked by corruption on the
intermediate levels of the bureaucracy. There, corruption takes the form of superiors demanding
entry fees in exchange for positions on lower levels of the hierarchy. We have shown that this
link between corruption on different levels of the bureaucratic hierarchy and the necessity to
externally finance part of the entry fee results in high corruption levels if financial institutions
are missing. When corrupt officials finance the entry fee on the informal credit market, they
give their relatives a stake in corruption. Consequently, these groups of voters do not support
anti-corruption campaigns.
Our analysis has demonstrated that institutions matter in the fight against corruption. The
political preferences of agents depend on their economic opportunities that, in turn, depend on
the institutional environment. In the absence of financial institutions that provide productive
investment opportunities, citizens may rationally invest in activities linked to corruption by
financing entry fees. Petty corruption and political decisions are linked because savers then
oppose socially beneficial political measures that aim at abolishing these unproductive activities.
Financial institutions could thus contribute to the political success of anti-corruption policies. If
24
functioning financial institutions exist, investors do not depend on corruption and the incentives
of politicians to run on anti-corruption platforms increase.
For a country that strives to reduce corruption, one policy measure should be to establish a
functioning banking system. Moreover, banks should be given an incentive to fight against cor-
ruption by committing themselves not to finance corrupt ventures. Our model has demonstrate
that, if banks are able to screen, financial institutions always reduce the equilibrium corruption
level. However, even if banks are not able to screen, the presence of a functioning banking
sector in our model provides the relatives with an additional option to invest and neutralizes
their positive stake in corruption.
The mechanism we have characterized also feeds back into the incentives of a government
to establish the legal and institutional environment that allows a functioning banking sector
to develop. They are influenced, for example, by how much support a government gets for
liberalizing market entry for foreign banks that commit themselves to a code of ethics including
an anti-corruption policy. Hoff and Stiglitz (2004) endogenously derive the development of
market-supporting institutions in the political process. Political preferences for institutional
reform depend on the economic opportunities of agents. The political demand for institutions is
determined by the initial conditions in an economy such the previous experience with a market
economy, or the abundance of natural resources, macroeconomic policy, and also the existing
level of corruption. Therefore, the political economy of structural reforms and corruption are
closely related to each other.
With this paper, we hope to stimulate more empirical research on the practice of demanding
entry fees for lucrative positions and on the ways these entry fees are financed. As we have shown,
these practices can weaken the political preferences for anti-corruption measures. Therefore, a
more profound knowledge about these mechanisms would be important.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Proposition 2
The Nash bargaining solution obtains when bS maximizes the surplus that can be split among
the two parties:
bS = argmax[(U ISK (c)− USK(c))(U ISR (c)− USR(c))]
Both relatives and corrupt officials have the outside option to become depositors. Therefore,
the Nash bargaining solution has to fulfill U ISK (c) = U
IS
R (c) or:
[(n− 1) + αENRγ]σc− (1 + bS)(tc−A)− u(c) = A+ bS(tc−A) + r(2A− tc)− u(c)
Solving for bS , this condition yields bS = [(n−1)]σc−tc(1−r)−2rA2(tc−A) .
7.2 Proof of Proposition 3
The Nash bargaining solution obtains when bP maximizes the surplus that can be split among
the two parties:
bP = argmax[(U IPK (c)− UPK(c))(U IPR (c)− UPR (c))]
Explicitly writing out the utility levels and simplifying yields:
−(1 + bP )(tc−A) + (1 + r)tc = A+ bP (tc−A) + r(2A− tc)⇔ bP = r
Therefore, we derive U IPK (c) = U
P
K(c) and U
IP
R (c) = U
P
R (c).
7.3 Proof of Lemma 1
To obtain the equilibrium corruption level for the situation without financial institutions, we
use the utility functions defined in section 4.2 and insert them into the first order condition for
the equilibrium corruption level.
∂v
∂c
=
∑
J
αJSJ
(
−∂u(c)
∂c
)
+ (αRSR + αKSK)
σ(n− 1)− t
2
= 0
Rearranging yields the above condition.
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7.4 Proof of Lemma 2
To obtain the equilibrium corruption level for the situation with financial institutions and screen-
ing, we use the utility functions defined in section 4.3 for the case with screening and plug them
into the first order condition for the equilibrium corruption level:
∂v
∂c
= 0⇔
∑
J
αJSJ
(
−∂u(c)
∂c
)
+ (αKSK + αRSR)
σ (n− 1)− (1 + r)t
2
= 0
Rearranging yields the result.
7.5 Proof of Lemma 3
To obtain the equilibrium corruption level for the situation with financial institutions and pool-
ing, we use the utility functions defined in section 4.3 for the case where no screening is possible
and plug them into the first order condition for the equilibrium corruption level:
∂v
∂c
= 0⇔
∑
J
αJSJ
(
−∂u(c)
∂c
)
+ αKSK [σ (n− 1)− (1 + r)t] = 0
Rearranging yields the result.
7.6 Proof of Proposition 5
Comparing the first order conditions for the equilibrium corruption levels in the case without a
bank, as derived in lemma 1, and with banks offering screening contracts, as derived in lemma
2, yields:
∂u(c∗N )
∂c
− ∂u(c
∗
S)
∂c
=
(αKSK + αRSR)
σ(n−1)−t
2∑
J αJSJ
− (αKSK + αRSR)
σ(n−1)−(1+r)t
2∑
J αJSJ
This difference is positive if and only if −rt(SK+SR)2 < 0, using our assumption that αK = αR.
This is always true. As ∂u(c)∂c > 0 and
∂2u(c)
(∂c) > 0, this means that then, c
∗
N > c
∗
S .
7.7 Proof of Proposition 6
Comparing the first order conditions for the equilibrium corruption levels in the case without a
bank, as derived in lemma 1, and with banks offering pooling contracts, as derived in lemma 3,
yields:
∂u(c∗N )
∂c
− ∂u(c
∗
P )
∂c
=
(αKSK + αRSR)
σ(n−1)−t
2∑
J αJSJ
− αKSK [σ (n− 1)− (1 + r)t]∑
J αJSJ
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This difference is positive if and only if SK
(
σ(n−1)−t
2 − rt
)
< SR
σ(n−1)−t
2 , using our assumption
that αK = αR.
As ∂u(c)∂c > 0 and
∂2u(c)
(∂c) > 0, this means that then, c
∗
N > c
∗
P .
7.8 Proof of Proposition 7
Comparing the first order conditions for the equilibrium corruption levels in the case with banks
offering pooling contracts, as derived in lemma 3 and in the case with banks offering screening
contracts, as derived in lemma 2, yields:
∂u(c∗P )
∂c
− ∂u(c
∗
S)
∂c
=
αKSK [σ (n− 1)− (1 + r)t]∑
J αJSJ
− (αKSK + αRSR)[
σ(n−1)−(1+r)t
2 ]∑
J αJSJ
This difference is negative if and only if 2αKSK < αRSR + αKSK , i.e., SK < SR, using our
assumption that αK = αR.
As ∂u(c)∂c > 0 and
∂2u(c)
(∂c) > 0, this means that then, c
∗
S > c
∗
P .
28
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